INTRODUCTION
The aim of the paper is to analyse the countries of South East Europe (SEE) as a location for foreign direct investment (FDI). In the first section we present the economic situation and trends in SEE countries, which are of specific relevance for investors from abroad. Second section deals with FDI trends and situation in SEE countries, while the third section analyses investment climate in SEE countries. Section four argue in favour of speeding up EU and regional integration processes in the SEE region, and section five concludes. During the past decade, the SEE countries as a group recorded much slower economic growth and progress in transition as compared to the CEE fast-reforming countries in transition (Stern 1998, Fisher and Sahay 2000) . Their slow progress in transition can be attributed not only to inconsistent macroeconomic stabilisation policies, recurrent economic crises and unfavourable initial conditions, but also to the devastating consequences of wars and political and ethnic conflicts in the region. This resulted in the region lagging behind CEE, in which the process of transition was much more successful thanks to a relatively stable political environment and clear orientation towards a fast and efficient implementation of reforms. However, the growth rates in the last three years were higher in SEE than in CEE countries. The SEE countries had different starting positions and are characterised by a wide disparity in the progress of reforms and economic growth during the past decade. The former Yugoslav republics, which had some experience with a market economy and much higher GDP per capita, had more favourable starting Croatia -21,1 -11,7 -8 5,9 6,8 6 6,5 2,5 -0,9 2,9 3,8 3,5 4,2 91
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Serbia and 8 2, 5 6, 1 7, 8 10 ,1 1,9 -18  5 5,5  3  2  50 positions than the other, mostly centrally planned, countries from this region (Gligorov 2000) (Table 1) . Political and armed conflicts in some of the former Yugoslav republics brought about a slowdown in the process of transition and even its suspension. Moreover, very unfavourable macroeconomic trends made them lose the advantage of having a relatively favourable starting position. The economic recovery of SEE was slow and unsustainable. As opposed to the CEE region, where the transition recession lasted for a shorter period and the decline in GDP was less pronounced, so that its level from the pre-transition period could be reached as early as 1997, the SEE region is characterised by a considerably longer period of transition recession and less stable macroeconomic trends. The fall in GDP in the SEE countries was much more pronounced and the periods of recovery were short and unsustainable (Table 2) .
Such trends can be largely explained by slow and incomplete reforms in SEE. The initial phase of transition produced some positive results in the whole region. Namely, noteworthy results were achieved in the field of liberalisation and small-scale privatisation. However, the structural and institutional challenges of the next phase of transition, including corporate governance, enterprise restructuring, financial sector reform, infrastructure reform, as well as fiscal and social sector reform posed a much more serious problem for the SEE countries. These reforms were slow and incomplete. The slow restructuring of enterprises and the financial sector, problematic corporate governance and the lack of crucial institutional infrastructure in the region brought about a slowdown in the process of transition and posed a serious obstacle to future economic growth.
The progress made in carrying out reforms was largely reflected in the movement of GDP in the region. The first phase of transition recession, which lasted until 1994 and was marked by a certain degree of liberalisation and progress in the process of privatisation, was followed by the period (1994-96) during which GDP growth was restored to some extent. Due to slow and incomplete reforms in the second phase of transition, the region plunged again into a serious economic crisis (in the period 1997-99), which also brought about a decline in GDP in most countries. The most severe crisis in the region was in 1999, during the armed conflicts in Kosovo and NATO bombing of Serbia and Montenegro. The resoluteness of the international community to take an active part not only in resolving political conflicts in the region, but also in creating conditions for its economic recovery and efficient reforms after the suspension of hostilities in Kosovo, resulted in the resumption of the process of reforms and economic recovery of the region to some degree in 2000. The favourable trend was recorded in 2001, 2002 and 2003 , but the good prospects this trend to continue in the forthcoming period might be jeopardised by recent conflicts in Kosovo. During the period of reforms, investments were displaying similar trends to GDP. When contrasted to the former Yugoslav republics, in which a sharp decline in the investment rate was recorded as early as the 1980s, the other countries in this region, like the CEE countries, had a relatively high investment rate in the pre-transition period. In the early 1990s, the investment rates in all countries in the region declined sharply, so that in 1994 their level was only 15 per cent (Table 3) .
The low level of investment activity in the SEE countries during the past decade posed an obstacle to faster economic reforms and economic recovery of the region, because investment activity not only increases the capital stock of the economy, but also exerts influence on the restructuring of enterprises and the economy as a whole. In addition, it facilitates the optimal reallocation of existing material and human resources.
The level of domestic saving in the SEE countries was relatively low. Since domestic saving was insufficient to finance the total amount of investment required for the optimal reallocation of resources and radical economic structural change, the inflow of foreign capital was a vital prerequisite for the continuation of reforms and transition process. The inflow of foreign capital was not sufficient so as to increase the level of investment in the region as required, because the inflow of official capital was relatively modest and private foreign capital was not sufficiently interested in investing in this region due to its unfavourable investment environment.
During the past decade, official capital flows into all transition countries declined in relative importance and private foreign capital became the principal external source of investment. In the CEE countries, which carried out social and economic reforms in large measure, official capital lost its importance almost completely. However, for the SEE countries it is still important as an additional source of investment, as well as due to its favourable effects on the progress of reforms in those countries, which are facing the problems in conducting the process of transition. Official capital lessens the investment risk and uncertainty, while at the same time increasing the amount of domestic and foreign investment. This form of capital also plays an important role in the development of the necessary institutional infrastructure. The involvement of the international community in the economic recovery of the region since 1999 has contributed to a rise in the inflow of official capital, provided primarily by international financial organisations with a view to speeding up economic reforms and creating more favourable conditions for the attraction of private foreign capital. Tables 4 and 5 show that FDI is primarily oriented to those countries in transition which have carried out their reforms successfully and at a fast pace. CEE countries, as the most advanced countries in transition, have been the main recipients of FDI. At the same time, the flows of FDI into the slow-reforming SEE countries were more hesitant and slower, and these countries attracted a much smaller amount of this form of private foreign capital. The flow of FDI into SEE was especially low until 1997. At the end of 1996, FDI stock in the whole region amounted to only US$ 3 billion, thus being almost fourteen times smaller than that in the CEE region at the same time. Slow progress in reforms, coupled with a high degree of political instability during that period, made this region absolutely unattractive to foreign investors (OECD 2000) . In the period up to 1997, there were considerable differences in FDI inflows among individual SEE countries. More than 40 percent of total inward FDI stock was invested in Romania, another 29 percent in Croatia and 15 percent in Bulgaria. FDI in other countries in this region was much more modest. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro were the only countries without FDI inflow during that period due to armed conflicts in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the political situation in Serbia and Montenegro, in addition to the UN-imposed sanctions. Since 1997, FDI inflows have been accelerated, mainly as the result of a change of the privatisation methods in the majority of the SEE countries, from insider privatisation to direct sales and international tenders. This brought about a rise in FDI inflow, whose structure was dominated by privatisation-related FDI. Since 1997, the accelerated process of privatisation in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania has significantly increased FDI flows into the region. A special influence on the increase in FDI inflow during the observed period was exerted by the In 2002, the ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP in SEE countries mostly ranged between approximately 20 percent in Romania and Albania and almost 30 percent in Bulgaria and Croatia, Macedonia being somewhere in between with 24.6 percent. Serbia and Montenegro with 10.6 percent has far the lowest ration. In terms of inward FDI stock to GDP ratio the differences between the SEE and CEE countries seem to be lower than in the case of absolute amounts of FDI. Still, the ratios in Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Latvia are higher than in any SEE country. 
FDI IN SEE COUNTRIES

INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN SEE COUNTRIES
A favourable investment environment is a vital prerequisite for FDI to come in a country. Experience shows that the largest inflow of FDI was recorded in those transition countries, which have the most favourable investment environment thanks to the successful implementation of reforms. In this regard, the CEE countries have made the greatest progress as compared to other countries in transition, including the SEE ones.
The investment climate in the SEE cannot be regarded as attractive compared to other regions although this scenario is changing. In large measure, it reflects the hitherto modest progress in carrying out economic and social reforms in the region. Despite two serious recessions during the past decade, the periods of macroeconomic instability and delays in carrying out reforms, which alternated with the shorter periods of ostensible economic recovery, the region has achieved some favourable results. The SEE countries mostly completed the initial phase of transition, whereby they made evident progress in liberalisation and small-scale privatisation, and achieved a certain degree of macroeconomic stability.
In comparison with other areas of reforms, SEE made the greatest progress with respect to price, trade and foreign exchange liberalisation. In this regard, the SEE countries are almost keeping pace with the CEE countries. In 2001, considerable progress in the process of liberalisation was also made in Serbia and Montenegro, which was the only country in the region which was lagging so much in that respect. Although some countries have retained a certain degree of price control, it can be stated that the whole region achieved the degree of liberalisation that does not pose an obstacle to FDI inflow.
Small-scale privatisation was relatively successful in almost all countries in this region. Although Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina are slightly lagging behind the other countries, they are on a good path to make further progress in this area of reform implementation. The small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) sector in the SEE countries is the healthiest part of their economies. Despite evident progress in small-scale privatisation, SEE is still lagging behind the CEE region, which already completed that phase of reforms with success.
Economic Annals no 163, October 2004 -December 2004 The SEE region finally succeeded in achieving a certain degree of macroeconomic stability after two periods of pronounced macroeconomic instability (in the early 1990s and in the period 1997-99). There are good prospects that it will be maintained in the coming period as well, if not jeopardised by the political conflicts in Kosovo. The growth prospects of the region are favourable, while the inflation rates are recording a downward tendency. In 2003, only two countries recorded two digit inflation, Romania 14.5% and Serbia and Montenegro 12.0%. The external sector of the SEE countries is still fragile, since exports are much higher than imports. In 2003, current account deficit in SEE region was -8.6 per cent of GDP, ranging between -6.0 percent in Croatia and -15.0 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Despite evident progress in the macroeconomic stabilisation of the region, as well as in liberalisation and small-scale privatisation, there is still a number of obstacles in the region, which generate an adverse effect on the quality of the investment environment and, thus, on FDI inflow. A large number of those obstacles are the result of a slow implementation of reforms in the second phase of transition, involving the development of institutional infrastructure and privatisation, as well as the restructuring of enterprises and the financial sector. The main obstacles to FDI flows into the SEE region are:
-High investment risks (due to circumstances in some part of the region and more generally, historical perceptions); -The lack of adequate and modern physical infrastructure; -Delays in bank restructuring and rehabilitation; 3 -Underdeveloped financial markets; -Delays in large-scale privatisation and enterprise reform; -Inadequate development level of institutional infrastructure; -Administrative barriers to FDI; -Unfavourable legal environment; -Inadequate institutional strategy and promotional capacities to attract, retain and maximise FDI inflows. 1 High political risks in the region in the past decade posed one of the greatest obstacles to FDI inflow although this varied amongst countries. Private foreign capital is very sensitive to any investment risk, so that the countries with an unstable political and economic environment are almost unattractive to private foreign investors. As long as there are relatively high political risks, it will be difficult to attract this form of investment despite good prospects for highly profitable investments. During the past decade, SEE was a region with very high investment risks due to armed, ethnic and political conflicts that broke out after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia (Penev 2001) .
The suspension of hostilities and relative relaxation of political tension in the region were of utmost significance for the lessening of political risks, but not for their total elimination or changing lingering perceptions. In Kosovo there is still a high degree of political tension and instability.
Privatisation and restructuring of large socially-and state-owned lossmaking enterprises were much less successful in comparison with small-scale privatisation in the SEE countries. Mass voucher privatisations carried out in the majority of these countries during the first half of the 1990s did not result in the restructuring and economic recovery of large privatised enterprises. The privatised enterprises remained to have fragmented ownership structure, inadequate managerial structure and the modest amount of available funds for additional investments.
After unfavourable experiences with mass voucher privatisations, the SEE countries shifted to more efficient revenue-raising privatisations, including the
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Foreign direct investment and the investment climate in south-east Europe sale of enterprises to strategic investors through international tenders. It was attempted not only to secure the inflow of fresh capital, but also to restructure privatised enterprises more efficiently by making use of other favourable effects of FDI. The change of the privatisation methods had a favourable effect on the flow of privatisation-related FDI into the region, primarily due to a more intensified process of large-scale privatisation and several successful large-scale privatisations in Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. Despite the initial results, the process of privatisation of large socially-and state-owned enterprises has already encountered serious obstacles due to the impossibility of finding strategic partners for investing in their privatisation. This refers especially to the less developed countries in the region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro). Although some enterprises are offered for sale at a very low price, the level of their indebtedness, redundancies, obsolete equipment and poor condition of their facilities and related infrastructure discourage potential foreign investors.
Despite the problems relating to large-scale privatisations, it is expected that the process will be continued in the coming period, albeit with a varying degree of success across the countries.
A considerably greater problem relating to the improvement of the investment environment will be to raise the quality of governance and enterprise restructuring. Soft budget constraints and poor corporate governance are still present in most SEE countries, so that the least progress has so far been made in this sector.
The development of the banking and financial sector (banking sector and non-banking financial institutions) was one of the most difficult reform areas, not only in SEE, due to the inherited low development level of this sector in the pre-reform period and the non-existence or low development level of financial institutions in the region. The unfavourable situation in the banking and financial sector in the SEE countries posed a serious obstacle to FDI flow into the region in the early 1990s.
Despite various problems and obstacles encountered in the implementation of reforms in this sector, most countries in this region still made some progress. The progress made in developing the banking sector was considerably faster than the progress made in developing securities markets and non-banking financial institutions in the SEE countries. Most banks were privatised with a large participation of foreign banks. New foreign and domestic banks were also established, while some of the unsuccessful domestic banks were closed. This had a favourable impact on enhancing competition and the quality of services in this sector in most SEE countries, but the region as a whole is still lagging far behind the CEE countries in this respect.
Croatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania have made considerably greater progress in the restructuring of the banking sector than other countries in the region. Therefore, the underdeveloped banking sector and the quality of banking services -not only in Serbia and Montenegro, which began restructuring its banking sector as late as 2001, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Albania, still pose a serious obstacle to the creation of a favourable investment environment and, thus, to FDI inflow.
Due to the much slower development of securities markets and non-banking financial institutions, the development level of the financial market and other non-banking institutions is very low in the majority of these countries. However, it poses a much greater obstacle to the inflow of portfolio investment, since FDI inflow depends to a much lesser degree on the quality of financial markets. Even in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, which made the greatest progress in this area, the development level of these financial institutions is still inadequate and far below the market-economy standards. The condition of physical infrastructure is one of the major preconditions for the creation of a favourable investment environment and FDI inflow. By initiating the process of transition to a market economy, the former socialist countries had, as one of their priorities, to improve the quality and price competitive- ness of their infrastructural services, which had not been adjusted to marketbased economic conditions in the pre-reform period. A vital prerequisite for the replacement of the inherited obsolete technology and equipment in this sector was to intensify investment activity. The decline of domestic capital formation and the low level of domestic saving, coupled with the persistent budget deficit in these countries, prevented any significant investment finance from the budget, as was practised in this countries in the pre-reform period. Since the government budget cannot secure sufficient investment finance, the participation of foreign and domestic private capital in infrastructure investment will be of great significance, not only because it will provide fresh capital for such investment, but also because it will enable the commercialisation of infrastructural services and, thus, the improvement of their quality. In most SEE countries, foreign private capital has so far been invested in the telecommunications sector. However, private investment in this sector does not guarantee a rise in the level and quality of services, because the possibility that foreign investors assume a monopolistic position on the domestic market poses an additional threat to the levels of prices and quality of these services in the SEE countries. This is shown by the unfavourable experience of Serbia and Montenegro where, despite the privatisation of Telecom, investment activity was not intensified as expected, while the level of prices rose appreciably. It is expected that private investments in the power supply sector will be intensified in the coming period. This would have a favourable influence on solving the problem of electric power shortage, in particular, in some SEE countries, which otherwise poses a serious obstacle to FDI flows into them.
Investments in the construction of the road and railway networks in the SEE countries are still insufficient, so that the greater improvement of the quality of related services can be expected only after the completion of a number of regional projects which are financed by international financial institutions (EIB, EBRD, WB).
Despite the interest of foreign investors in investing in physical infrastructure and active participation of international financial institutions in financing the development of infrastructure in the region, the quality of related services will be a problem for the majority of SEE countries for a long time, and will pose one of the most serious obstacles to FDI inflow. The difficulties in removing this obstacle to FDI inflow arise largely from the need to provide an extremely large amount of investment so as to achieve the desired quality of services, acceptable to foreign investors.
Administrative barriers to FDI are present in all countries in this region. The complicated administrative procedures required for the start-up and operation of a business discourage the inflows of FDI. The related costs are less significant for foreign investors. The most serious barriers appear to be delays in gaining access to sites and obtaining building permits, which may take more than a year in some SEE countries. The level of administrative costs is positively correlated with corruption incidence and displays a negative correlation with the quality of governance, degree of openness and wages in the public sector. These correlations suggest that administrative reforms should be incorporated into the broader agenda for reforms, such as trade and financial liberalisation, the fight against corruption and public sector administration (see Morisset and Lumenga Neso 2002) . Unfavourable legal and regulatory environment is not only a result of the non-existence of legislation which is harmonised with the market-economy standards, but also of an inadequate implementation of existing laws (EBRD 2002a) . Although much greater progress was made in enacting the new, modern and liberal laws and the revision of certain existing ones with the aim to harmonise them with the market-economy standards, the implementation of these laws as well as the lack of adequate institutional infrastructure still pose the most serious obstacle to the creation of a favourable legal environment in the SEE countries.
Private foreign capital is very sensitive to any legal uncertainty, which points out that the creation of a favourable legal and regulatory environment for FDI flows into the region is of utmost significance.
EU AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS DETERMINANTS OF FDI INFLOWS
In the above transition context, we argue that there are two specific reform and policy directions which could help in making the SEE region a more attractive FDI location. The first is EU integration process of SEE countries and the second is regional integration and co-operation among them.
There is theoretical and empirical evidence, which demonstrates that EU integration processes, in the accession and membership phase, significantly and positively influence the FDI inflows in the accessing countries. One can distinguish between primary and secondary effects of economic integration on FDI flows. Primary effects relate to: (i) defensive export-substituting investment, which replaces exports with FDI in a country of integration (increased market-seeking FDI inflows in the integration region) and (ii) reorganisation investment due to new configuration of location advantages among integration member countries (FDI gains in some countries are offset by FDI losses in others). Secondary effect of integration is of the greatest importance. It arises from the restructuring of activities between countries, sectors and firms, and from the new opportunities due to integration. Lower transaction costs increase capital mobility within internal market. This increases FDI in regionally based affiliates and sourcing by MNEs in the region (Dunning 1993) . In short, why should one expect increase of FDI in countries integrating in the EU. There are two basic reasons. The first is reduction of risk, which brings new investment opportunities. The second is the effect of the increased size of the market (economies of scale) and the third is the "internal market" component, which importantly reduces transaction costs (application of acquis communautaire, unification of institutional infrastructure) and brings new configuration of location advantages.
On the empirical level, the experiences of Denmark, Ireland, UK, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden show an increased amount of inward FDI in the context of their EU integration processes. FDI inflows, in absolute terms and as a share of total EU inflows, began to increase already few years before their actual accession. In all the above countries absolute amount of FDI inflows further increased after accession. But in relative terms -as a share of EU inflowsthe effect of accession seems to be absorbed already before accession. In most countries the shares have not increased much after accession (Rosati 1998 , UNC-TAD 2003 . The situation in the case of Eastern Enlargement is pretty much the same as far as the pre-accession FDI trends is concerned. As shown by Figure 1 , FDI inflows in the accession countries have been constantly increasing in the recent years. Economist Intelligence Unit (2003) predicts that the share of 8 Central European accession countries plus of Romania and Bulgaria in world inward FDI stock will increase from 2.2% in 2000 to 3.2% in 2007. Bevan and Estrin (2000) and Merlevede and Schoors (2004) also claim that announcements of progress in EU accession by the Commission impacted directly upon FDI receipts of the Eastern Enlargement accession countries.
FIGURE 1: FDI inflows to Eastern Enlargement accession countries
Source: UNCTAD 2003.
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Although one can not precisely isolate and directly assess the relevance of the EU integration process as such on FDI inflows, it seems pretty sure that its effect is positive and significant. In this context, a strong and clear commitment of SEE countries that structural/institutional and legal reforms will follow the EU pattern, i.e. the establishment of an EU-compatible institutional framework, would be of great importance. It would reduce (i) the risk perception of these countries by foreign investors and (ii) also the danger of further widening the institutional gap between them and the new EU member countries. Bevan and Estrin (2000) , and Merlevede and Schoors (2004) warn that a further differentiation between new member states and left-outs may happen in favour of the former.
On the other hand, the Eastern Enlargement is also going to gradually establish a "new frontier" for efficiency-seeking FDI. A number of efficiency-seeking type of activities of foreign subsidiaries now located in the new EU member countries will gradually move out of the EU, SEE countries being an obvious location. The issue for SEE governments is how to adjust policies and measures to exploit the opportunities offered by this new situation (UNCTAD 2003) . The issue of friendly business environment and EU compatible legal and institutional framework again come in the forefront here.
Intensification of regional integration and co-operation among SEE countries is another process, which would increase the attractiveness of SEE region as an investment location. In view of the fact that, except Romania, all SEE country markets are small and that the region's total GDP is very low, each of them, if alone, has a market which is not sufficiently attractive for market-seeking FDI. An SEE free trade area would mean the market of over 57 million inhabitants, which will be much more attractive than the individual markets of the SEE countries. Regional integration would also have positive effects on the lessening of high political risks in the region and, thus, on the improvement of its investment climate. Regional integration is also one of the preconditions for the SEE countries to speed up the process of EU integration.
CONCLUSIONS
FDI has become increasingly important for countries in transition, but it is primarily oriented to those countries in transition which have carried out their reforms successfully and at a fast pace. At the same time, the flows of FDI into the slow-reforming SEE countries were more hesitant and slower. The flow of FDI into SEE was especially low until 1997. Slow progress in reforms, coupled with a high degree of political instability during that period, made this region absolutely unattractive to foreign investors. Since 1997, FDI inflows have been accelerat-ed, mainly as the result of a change of the privatisation methods in the majority of the SEE countries, from insider privatisation to direct sales and international tenders. This brought about a rise in FDI inflow, whose structure was dominated by privatisation-related FDI. The EU member countries as a group are the major investors in the region as a whole, as well as in most of its countries.
The investment climate in the SEE has improved in recent years, but much more needs to be done in order to attract larger and sustained volumes of FDI. In large measure, the present investment climate reflects the hitherto relatively modest progress in carrying out economic and social reforms in the region. Despite two serious recessions during the past decade, that the region has achieved some favourable results. The SEE countries mostly completed the initial phase of transition, whereby they made evident progress in liberalisation and small-scale privatisation, and achieved a certain degree of macroeconomic stability. Despite evident progress in the macroeconomic stabilisation of the region, as well as in liberalisation and small-scale privatisation, there is still a number of obstacles in the region, which generate an adverse effect on the quality of the investment environment and, thus, on FDI inflow. A large number of those obstacles are the result of a slow implementation of reforms in the second phase of transition, involving the development of institutional infrastructure and privatisation, as well as the restructuring of enterprises and the financial sector. The main obstacles to FDI flows into the SEE region are: high investment risks, the lack of adequate physical infrastructure, delays in bank restructuring and rehabilitation, underdeveloped financial markets, delays in large-scale privatisation and enterprise reform, inadequate development level of institutional infrastructure, administrative barriers to FDI and unfavourable legal environment.
The potential advantages of SEE for attracting FDI are not so numerable, but their identification is of utmost significance for the creation of FDI strategy in this region. The most important potential advantage is the availability of qualified and relatively cheap labour. Other comparative advantages of the region are less significant, but they still may have a positive effect on the attraction of the FDI. The size of the market and growing purchasing power of the population and the geographical location of the region are only conditional advantages. In the next few years it is more realistic to expect FDI into privatisation related projects than in export oriented greenfield projects, since greenfield projects request much better defined FDI policy and less barriers. FDI policy as such, however, could have only a limited impact.
The major determinant of future FDI inflows in SEE countries are factors like market size and growth, speed and scope of market reforms, political, economic and legal stability, reduction of administrative barriers and implementation gap, speed and scope of EU integration etc., which are not specifically related to FDI and whose importance is far beyond the FDI issues. These factors are related to the major transition and EU integration issues. In this context, a strong and clear commitment of SEE countries that structural/institutional and legal reforms will follow the EU pattern, i.e. the establishment of an EU-compatible institutional framework, would be of major importance. It would reduce (i) the risk perception of these countries by foreign investors and (ii) also the danger of further widening the institutional gap to the new EU member countries. Namely, some warn that a further differentiation between new member states and leftouts may happen in favour of the former. On the other hand, the Eastern Enlargement is also going to gradually establish a "new frontier" for efficiencyseeking FDI. A number of efficiency-seeking type of activities of foreign subsidiaries now going on in the new EU member countries will gradually move out of the EU, SEE countries being an obvious location. To exploit this opportunity the issues of friendly business environment, EU compatible legal and institutional framework and SEE regional integration again come in the forefront.
